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Abstract 
Over the past thirty years, the Single European Market (SEM) has been the core business of 
the European Union, and enormous progress has been achieved in both ‘widening’ the 
economic activities covered by EU legislation and ‘deepening’ the acquis to overcome 
emerging gaps in integration in areas already covered by legislation. And yet, empirical 
evidence indicates that market integration has stalled on many fronts and, more importantly, 
that the expected economic benefits from integration in terms of higher growth of incomes, 
jobs, and productivity have fallen short of expectations, notably in the long-established EU-15 
member states. The situation has not improved after the introduction of the euro.  
The purpose of this paper is to review the main developments in SEM legislation and 
regulatory activities over the past three decades; summarize the results of the SEM 
programme in market integration, highlighting the areas where gaps appear more important; 
and discuss the impact of economic integration within the SEM, including aspects that play an 
important role in feeding popular resistance to integration. 
Keywords: Single European Market, Regulatory models, Free movements, goods, person, 
capital, services. 
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Introduction 
Over the past thirty years the Single European Market (henceforth SEM) has been the core 
business of the European Union, and enormous progress has been achieved in both 
‘widening’ the economic activities covered by EU legislation and in ‘deepening’ the acquis to 
overcome emerging gaps in integration in areas already covered by legislation (Pelkmans 
2011). And yet, empirical evidence indicates that market integration has stalled on many 
fronts and, more important, that the expected economic benefits from integration in terms of 
higher growth of incomes, jobs and productivity have fallen short of expectations, notably in 
the long-established EU-15 member states. The situation has not improved after the 
introduction of the euro.  
The purpose of this paper is to review the main developments in SEM legislation and 
regulatory activities over the past three decades; summarize the results of the SEM 
programme in market integration, highlighting the areas where gaps appear more important; 
and discuss the impact of economic integration within the SEM, including aspects that play an 
important role in feeding popular resistance to integration. Although SEM policies for 
financial services will be discussed, recent developments in the Banking Union and 
Commission proposals for a Capital Markets Union will not be covered, except for aspects of 
general relevance for the SEM’s broad architecture.  
The paper’s perspective is that of an economist who has devoted much of his professional life 
to matters of economic and monetary integration in Europe, and who, by necessity, has 
become keenly aware of the importance of legal and institutional arrangements for the 
functioning of economic systems. Particular attention will be paid to the issues of economic 
incentives in institutional design, while steering away from the detailed legal complexities and 
controversies surrounding SEM laws.  
1. Overview
The goal of economic integration constituted the principal focus of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
in the specific form of the establishment of a common internal market, characterized by the 
freedom of movement of goods, services and productive factors (labour and capital). Its 
distinguishing feature was, in addition to being a free trade area and a custom union with a 
common external tariff, the aim of eliminating ‘technical’ barriers arising from national rules 
for the protection of health, safety and the environment, and to a limited extent of tax 
barriers as well. 
Three features stand out in this regard (Craig 2003). First, integration entails not only the 
elimination of barriers (‘negative’ integration) but also the harmonization of legislation that 
provides standards of protection of worthy goals of general interest (‘positive’ integration) 
applicable throughout the SEM. Second, the elimination and prevention of barriers also 
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concerns behaviour that may distort the level playing field in the SEM after the market has 
been opened, i.e. by means of public subsidies and protections granted in the domestic 
market to national players or anti-competitive actions by national players. These distortions 
are addressed through competition policy and in particular state aid policy – a policy unique 
to the European construction that directly constrains the member states. Third, market 
opening and liberalization do not preclude public intervention, e.g. environmental protection 
through the Common Agricultural Policy or cohesion policies to help weaker economies 
withstand the impact of market opening. Common policies will normally be administered by 
the Commission – often under Council oversight through specialised Council committees. 
Already in the early years of the Economic Community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
emerged as a fundamental player in the integration process through its adjudication of cases 
and ‘preliminary’ rulings on questions raised by national courts regarding the treaty’s 
interpretation. Its central role in the development of the SEM came to the fore with early 
decisions establishing the direct effect1 and the supremacy over national legislation2 of 
Community rules in areas of Community competence. They laid the ground for landmark 
decisions such as Reyners,3 Dassonville4 and Cassis de Dijon,5 with paramount consequences 
on the subsequent evolution of legislation.  
The SEM programme was formally launched in June 1985 by the Commission White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market, endorsed by the European Council in Milan at the end of the 
same month. Its main message, which built upon the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence, was that 
there was no need to seek harmonization when barriers to free movement would come down 
under the rule of reason of equivalent protection. Henceforth harmonization measures would 
be limited to restrictions that could be justified under the mandatory grounds allowed by the 
Treaty, and, therefore, could only be eliminated by legislation raising the common level of 
protection in that particular area, recognizing the legitimate concerns of member states and 
restoring free movement.  
The White Paper included proposals for Treaty changes that would simplify and speed up the 
legislative process. In the ensuing months, an intergovernmental conference swiftly reached 
an agreement on those proposals, leading to the Single European Act (SEA) that was signed in 
February 1986. After ratification by member states, it entered into force on 1 July 1987. The 
SEA provided the definition of the SEM as an “area without frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” (now in Article 26 of TFEU)6 and 
introduced (qualified) majority voting in the Council for SEM measures, together with a new 
1 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos vs. Administratie der Belastingen [1963]. 
2 Case 6/64, Costa vs. Enel [1964]. 
3 Case 2/74, Reyners vs. Belgian State [1974] recognizing direct effect to freedom of establishment to what is 
now Article 47 of TFEU.  
4 Case 8/74, Procurer du Roi vs. Benôit and Gustave Dassonville [1974]. 
5 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG vs. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] establishing the principle 
of mutual recognition of national rules and thus opening the way to the application of Article 34 TFEU to 
indistinctly applicable national rules.  
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
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co-operation procedure with the European Parliament, which later lead to full co-decision 
under the Maastricht Treaty. Under the new legal basis for SEM measures (Article 100a TEEC,7 
now 114 TFEU) the Commission developed the New Approach to SEM legislation, limiting 
legislative measures to setting the essential requirements of protection, while confining 
technical specifications to voluntary standards developed by European standardization 
bodies.  
The economic rationale of the SEM programme laid in the belief that market opening would 
revive the feeble European economy by fostering concentration and the exploitation of 
economies of scale in industry, improving the allocation of productive resources, and raising 
productivity. The 1988 Cecchini Report described at considerable length the structural 
weaknesses of the European economy and its specialization in sectors with low growth 
potential, and holding out the promise that completion of the SEM programme would bring 
substantial economic benefits (ranging from 4.25 to 6.5 per cent of GDP). 
The White Paper tabled some 300 harmonization measures, mainly in the domain of goods, 
which by and large were approved by the statutory deadline of 1992 (cf. Pelkmans 2008 and 
2011); additional liberalization directives were enacted in the ensuing years for opening to 
competition services – notably network industries (starting with telecom and moving on to 
energy, transport, and postal services) and financial services.  
In network industries, the presence of increasing returns and, sometimes, natural monopoly 
market structures, inevitably pushed SEM initiatives beyond market opening into the domain 
of regulation to ensure open access by competitors and a level playing field in the provision of 
services to final users. Network services were normally also services of general interest; 
Article 86 TEC8 (now 106 TFEU) provided the flexible framework required to ensure that free 
movement and competition rules would apply to these services without compromising their 
specific mission (European Commission 2000b). The tensions with some member states on 
the delicate balance between national social preferences and SEM rules led, with the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, to a new provision – Article 16 TEC, now 14 TFEU – reaffirming 
the special role of services of general interest in the “shared values of the Union”. Protocol 26 
to the treaties clarifies that this includes respecting the autonomy of national authorities, at 
all levels of government, in deciding on public services and organizing their provision, 
although the Union will continue to scrutinize whether the means of provision are consistent 
with SEM rules.  
Further advancements in SEM policies were achieved by strengthening ‘accompanying 
policies’, e.g., with the approval of the Merger Regulation,9 on one hand, and the new 
economic cohesion policies and R&D policies, supported by substantial budgetary resources, 
on the other. These measures are complementary, as weaker economies are provided with 
7 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.  
8 Treaty establishing the European Community. 
9 Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, now Regulation (EC) 139/2004. 
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extra resources to withstand increased competitive pressure stemming from market opening 
and the expected concentration of industry. The single currency was created to reinforce the 
integration and competition effects of the SEM by improving price transparency, reducing the 
costs of cross-border transactions, and eliminating the exchange rate risk.10 For reasons that 
are not yet fully understood, while there have been positive effects on growth, market 
integration has been less pronounced than anticipated, with the productivity performance of 
many Euro Area members worsening rather than improving (more on this, later).  
Once the wave of legislation prompted by the White Paper was completed, it soon became 
evident that important economic activities were not covered and that, in many respects, 
existing legislation fell short of bringing about genuine integration (Pelkmans 2011). The 
changing economic environment, including globalization, the development of new 
technologies and the increased prominence of environmental issues in public policy, also 
greatly contributed to the legislative agenda, with new demands by the public and member 
states (‘widening’), and a continuing need to review and adapt existing legislation 
(‘deepening’). This is reflected in the multiplication of strategic reviews and new plans to 
‘complete’ the SEM (cf. Annex 1 in High-Level Panel of Experts, 2016). In fact, completion of 
the SEM has become a moving target requiring continuing adaptation. A summary of the main 
initiatives included in the White Paper and subsequent legislation is presented in Table 1. 
The Monti Report (Monti 2010) highlighted a strand of ideas that had been building up in SEM 
strategies over the previous decade, that is the socio-political legitimacy problems 
surrounding market opening and the need to (re-)build popular consensus around SEM goals. 
The Report stresses the importance of harnessing the SEM for the benefits of consumers, 
promoting green growth strategies and reviewing the appropriate balance between SEM 
freedoms and workers’ rights and expectations, which had been especially strained by the 
SEM rules on the posting of workers and related ECJ decisions, e.g. Laval.11  
Over time, these broader goals found Treaty recognition with new chapters on consumer 
protection, social policies and employment.12  
10 In the 2000s, the euro sovereign debt crisis reintroduced a re-denomination risk that widened the spreads 
between borrowing rates in the periphery and those prevailing in the ‘core’ countries, thus reversing integration 
and re-creating significant financial markets fragmentation.  
11 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri vs. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007]. The Monti Report 
was followed by a flurry of measures under the hats of the Single Market Acts I and II, on a broad front of 
themes (consumer empowerment, social entrepreneurship and SMEs financing, business environment, and 
taxation) and activities (digital market, utilities, services, and IPR), which however did not significantly advanced 
integration. 
12 With the Lisbon Treaty, they came to full prominence in Article 3 TEU, setting the Union goals of a 
“competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. ... [The Union] shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice ... It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity among Member States ...”. 
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Table 1. Single European Market (1985-2015): Overview 
Goods  Mutual recognition (ECJ, Cassis de Dijon 1979)
 Under the Single European Act (1986), SEM a Community task; a new
legislative procedure by QMV (with EP co-decision) and harmonization
of essential requirements
 Optional technical standards for compliance
Services (establishment 
and cross-border supply) 
 ECJ: from discrimination to restriction  ‘market access’ test and
‘general good’ principle (Vlassopoulou 1989 and Gebhard 1994 on right
of establishment; Sager 1990 and Gouda 1989 on freedom to provide
services)
General Regime  Framework Dir. 2006/123  horizontal principles applicable to all
services, except for services already harmonized and some specific
activities
Financial Markets  Single passport based on harmonized criteria for national licenses
 Home country supervision of financial institutions; host country control
for business conduct, consumer protection and ‘systemic’ stability of
host market
 Investment services and financial market infrastructure (MiFID II
2014/65, MiFIR 600/2014)
 European System of Financial Supervision comprising: (i) the European
Systemic Risk Board; (ii) the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA,
EIOPA, ESMA)
 The Banking Union package: Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single
Resolution Mechanism and Directives on national guarantees schemes
and national resolution schemes; CRD IV package for capital
requirements and prudential supervision
Services of General 
Interest 
 Amsterdam Treaty introduces article 14 TFEU, further supported by
Protocol 26 on SGI
Network Industries  For telecoms, gas and electricity, postal services, rails: market opening
(different progress) and pro-competitive regulation (access to network,
separation of service provision from infrastructure); in some cases
establishment of universal service obligations
 EU regulatory networks to complement national authorities (e.g.,
BEREC, ACER)
 Liberalization measures for air, road and maritime transport
Capital  Full freedom of movement (Dir. 88/361)
 Transparency and market integrity: Prospectus (Dir. 2003/71, under
review); Transparency (Dir. 2004/109, as amended in 2013); Market
abuse (Reg. 596/2014 and Dir. 2014/57 harmonizing criminal sanctions);
Shareholders’ Rights (Dir. 2007/36)
 Market for corporate control: Takeover Dir. 2004/25
 Company mobility: European Company Statute (Dir 2001/86 on workers
participation; Reg. 2157/2001 on establishment and governance of the
company’real seat’ approach, partly reversed by the ECJ)
 Capital Market Union Action Plan 2015
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Table 1. Single European Market (1985-2015): Overview 
Persons 
Workers  Workers’ mobility and residence right, equal treatment in working
conditions, and social and tax benefits (Reg. 492/2011)
 Supplementary pension rights (Dir. 98/49); coordination of social security
systems (Reg. 883/2004)
 Posted workers Dir. 96/71 (under review)
Professionals  Mutual recognition of professional qualifications with minimum training
requirements; from sectoral directives to horizontal approach (Dir.
2005/36, as amended by Dir. 2013/55  EU professional card)
Individuals  Maastricht Treaty  introduction of EU citizenship, including the right to
circulate and reside freely in the EU
 Comprehensive discipline of free movement and residence (temporary
and permanent) for EU citizens and their families in Dir. 2004/38
Horizontal 
Public Procurement  Coordination of the procurement procedures for the award of public
works, public supply and public service contracts above certain value
thresholds (with separate rules for public utility sectors): Dir. 2014/24 and
Dir. 2014/25
 New rules for concessions (Dir. 2014/23), imposing minimum
requirements for selection and award criteria and limited duration
IPR  Harmonized rules on copyright (Dir. 2001/29) trademarks (Dir.
2015/2436), industrial design (Dir. 98/71), biotechnological inventions
(Dir. 98/44), and trade secrets (Dir. 2016/943)
 EU-wide rights: EU trademark (Reg. 207/2009 as amended by Reg.
2015/2424); Community design (Reg. 6/2002); Unitary patent (Reg.
1257/2012 and Reg. 1260/2012)
 Procedures to enforce IPR against counterfeiting and piracy (Dir. 2004/48);
Unified Patent Court, not yet operational
Consumer and Data 
Protection 
 Health and safety: general product safety Dir. 2001/95; food safety Reg.
178/2002
 Consumers’ economic interests: minimum harmonization on liability for
defective products (Dir. 85/374), sales and guarantees (Dir. 1999/44),
consumer credit (Dir. 2008/48), unfair contract terms (Dir. 93/13), package
travel (Dir. 2015/2302); maximum harmonization approach for unfair
commercial practices (Dir. 2005/29) and consumers’ rights (Dir. 2011/83,
including distance contracts and right of withdrawal)
 Cooperation among national enforcers of consumer law (Reg. 2006/2004,
under review)
 General Data Protection Reg. 2016/679; e-privacy (Dir. 2002/58)
Digital Economy  E-commerce (Dir. 2000/21): information requirements for online activities
and contracts, transparency of commercial communications, limitation of
service providers’ liability
 Electronic identification (Reg. 910/2014), e-money (Dir. 2009/110),
payment services (Dir. 2015/2366)
 Digital Single Market Strategy (2015) including legislative proposals on
consumer protection in online sales, parcel delivery, geo-blocking
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Two main market opening initiatives in the past decade concerned services in general and 
financial services specifically. The first one was prompted by a Commission Report on The 
State of the Internal Market for Services (European Commission 2002) which thoroughly 
described the sorry state of integration in this sector, the main legal barriers and their impact 
on the economy, notably on small-medium enterprises (SMEs) and consumers. The Services 
Directive,13 approved by Council and Parliament in 2006 and expected to enter into force in 
2009, provided an adequate response but, as will be shown, implementation has been 
wanting.  
The second initiative is a decade-long attempt to integrate financial markets and set up a 
supranational regulatory structure for financial services, in response to repeated bouts of 
financial instability. Two Reports, one prepared at the beginning of the last decade under the 
chairmanship of Alexandre Lamfalussy (leading to the so-called Financial Services Action Plan, 
to be completed by 2005) and the other prepared by Jacques de Larosière at the end of the 
decade, mapped out comprehensive interventions to remove remaining restrictions to 
securities markets and create a new regulatory system able to avoid a repeat of the dramatic 
financial crisis of 2008-09.14 The Euro Area sovereign debt and banking crisis, at the beginning 
of this decade, convinced governments and regulators to raise the stakes and go for a full 
Banking Union (already well advanced at the time of this writing) and Capital Markets Union 
(as yet at an early stage of design). 
Horizontal legislative measures of increasing ambition have covered public procurement – for 
goods, services, public works and concessions – still stubbornly protected by national 
procurement authorities, and the markets for coded technology (IPR). The latter obviously is 
of paramount importance for encouraging Europe-wide circulation of new technology and its 
innovative applications, in a continent that has tended to privilege the protection of the 
investor over the diffusion of new ideas.  
Finally, in recent years, a comprehensive initiative has aimed to establish a Digital Single 
Market, in order to allow the Union to exploit the full economic potential of the ICT 
technologies (European Commission 2015a). The programme covers a broad range of themes 
and activities, organized around the three pillars of (i) consumer and business access to online 
markets across the Union, (ii) the legal and competitive environment and (iii) secure and 
trustworthy infrastructures.  
13 Directive 2006/123/EC. 
14 In line with parallel reforms on the US side with the Dodd-Frank legislation and the comprehensive review of 
prudential rules for banking agreed upon by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors, transposed at the EU 
level with the CRR/CRD IV package of 2013 (including Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 575/2013).  
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2. An Innovative Regulatory Model
The SEM is built on an innovative regulatory model that aims to open the markets of member 
states to free movement while respecting, as much as possible, the diversity of national 
institutions and regulatory approaches. It is a sui generis model of integration with diversity 
without precedents in regulatory history, entailing that the different national rulebooks for 
safety, health and consumer protection coexist and apply at the same time within each 
member state’s jurisdiction. 
This approach was built on the landmark Cassis de Dijon decision by the ECJ (1978), that 
established the principle of mutual recognition of national rules. With one stroke a myriad of 
technical barriers to free movement of goods were made illegal, thus relieving the European 
Commission of the task of seeking new legislation to bring them down. The decision was 
followed by other decisions refining the principle and extending its application to services and 
to persons seeking to move to another member state to reside and work.  
The next required building block was a more flexible legal basis to enable legislation on the 
SEM, and this was provided by the SEA with new the Article 100a TEEC (now Article 114 
TFEU). Under this legal basis, harmonization was based on three lines of action (Craig 2003):  
(i) Substantive legislation to harmonize safety, health and consumer protection
legislation by laying down the essential health and safety requirements, and
European standardization to offer an optional means of compliance with
harmonized requirements providing a presumption of conformity;
(ii) Procedurally oriented legislation to improve transparency of information on
national technical standards and regulations, and later on for public
procurement; with Directive 83/189/EEC,15 failure to notify these measures to
the EC network of mutual evaluation would make them null and void; the
information network, originally conceived for goods, was later extended to
cover technical measures for services;
(iii) Extension of mutual recognition by legislation, notably in the recognition of
professional qualifications and the services directive.
The combination of the principle of mutual recognition with the three pillars of legislative 
activity brings about a radical shift in economic philosophy: market opening is placed at the 
centre of economic policies not only to foster growth, but also to improve the welfare of 
citizens (Barnard 2013, Weiler 1999). Majority voting entails that, governments may, 
sometimes, be obliged to accept substantial departures from their national policies and 
regulatory traditions. While the consensual culture prevailing in Europe has normally 
translated into a reluctance to decide by majority voting, the very possibility of coming to a 
vote makes Council members better disposed to compromise.  
15 Later on, directive 98/34/EC and now directive (EU) 2015/1535. 
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Common policies have been sensitive to member states’ and citizens’ concerns, and have 
developed their tools so as to strike an acceptable balance between the community goal of 
free movement and national preferences in shaping protections. Following are some 
paramount examples of these frictions and the resulting balancing acts, which have often 
entailed remarkable creativity and innovativeness in drafting SEM rules. When referring to 
legal aspects of the SEM I will mainly follow the outstanding volume by Catherine Barnard 
(2013), while steering away from interpretative debates. 
(a) Market Access
The building blocks of the new model of legislation prompted by the White Paper are in two 
landmark ECJ decisions, Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, as already mentioned. Dassonville 
first established the definition of ‘measures having an equivalent effect’ to a quantitative 
restriction to trade prohibited by Article 34 (and 35) TFEU as follows: “all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Union trade ...”. Later decisions further clarified that the term ‘rules’ also 
includes policies (such as a ‘buy Irish’ campaign by the Irish government) and administrative 
practices.16 This very broad definition already anticipates the ‘market access’ principle 
extensively used later by the ECJ for the liberalization of establishment, the cross-border 
supply of services and the recognition of professional qualifications.   
A further building block is the distinction between ‘distinctly applicable’ measures,17 which 
openly discriminate against imported products, and ‘indistinctly applicable’ measures which, 
while not discriminatory, may nonetheless create obstacles to free circulation. The latter lay 
at the core of the Cassis de Dijon case; they are the result of disparities in national legislations 
concerning the marketing of products. The ECJ ruled that those measures must be complied 
with by the product trying to enter a member state’s market different from the member state 
of origin, only if they are recognized as necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
“relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, 
the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer”.18 Otherwise, they 
cannot be used to restrict free entry into the domestic market. Moreover, those measures 
should be proportionate to the aim in question and should satisfy a criterion of ‘least 
restriction’ to the free movement of goods in the choice between alternative measures that 
may achieve the same result. 
Thus, after rejecting the arguments by the German government wherein a national rule 
imposing a minimum alcoholic content for beverages was justified by mandatory 
requirements for the protection of health and consumers, the ECJ stated the basic principle of 
16 Case 249/81, Commission vs. Ireland [1982]. 
17 Already stated in Article 2 of Directive 70/50/EEC. 
18 Later decisions clarified that the mere existence of different rates of indirect taxation or any differential 
impact of national rules on competitive conditions would not represent per se a justification for restricting 
access to the domestic market under the consumer protection or fair trading grounds (e.g. Case 182/84, Miro 
BV. [1985]).  
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presumption of equivalence, or mutual recognition: it saw no valid reason why, “provided that 
they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic 
beverages should not be introduced into any other Member State”.  
The direct implication of Cassis de Dijon is that the producer’s home state regulation will, 
under normal circumstances, prevail over host state regulation where the product is sold and 
that the entry of a good can be refused only on grounds of the ‘imperative’ non-economic 
reasons listed in Article 36 TFEU, and the additional criteria developed in the ECJ 
jurisprudence on admissible mandatory requirements. The principle also has an important 
procedural implication: each member state must create a space for the evaluation of the rules 
of all the other member states within its administrative system, to ascertain whether a 
particular product qualifies for mutual recognition. Since the member states were less than 
enthusiastic disciples of mutual recognition, Regulation (EC) 764/2008 introduced 
administrative procedures to supplement judicial recourse when mutual recognition is 
denied. Under this procedure, the member state intending to prohibit the placing on the 
market of a product is obliged to explain the technical rule behind the prohibition and to set 
out the technical and scientific evidence justifying that decision.   
The ‘discrimination’ model implicit in Cassis de Dijon was gradually superseded by a stronger 
requirement of ‘market access’. With Sager,19 the Court ruled that the prohibition of 
restrictions to the supply of services in Article 56 TFEU required not only the elimination of all 
discriminations on grounds of nationality but also the abolition of restrictions “liable to 
prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another 
Member State where he lawfully provides such services”.  
Two further decisions, Kraus20 and Gebhard,21 struck down national measures limiting the 
domestic use by nationals of academic titles earned abroad and of domestic titles in the 
exercise of a profession by a foreign EU national. The measures were not qualified as 
discriminatory; rather they were struck down as “liable to hamper or to render less attractive 
the exercise by Union nationals ... of the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty”. In subsequent cases, especially for persons and capital, the Court has gone even 
further, replacing the reference to market access by the simple reference to ‘obstacles’ or 
‘restrictions’ on free movement. 
As emphasized by Barnard (2013), this evolution has placed tighter constraints on a member 
state’s ability to regulate market access. Under the new approach any domestic regulation 
may be seen as an obstacle to access – whereas under the previous ‘discrimination’ approach 
certain restrictions to access could be maintained, provided they applied uniformly to all 
market participants. In fact, the principle of market access is so broad as to become ill-
defined, opening the way to abusive exploitation of Treaty articles to oppose any national 
19 Case C-76/90, Säger vs. Dennemeyer [1991].  
20 Case C-19/92, Kraus vs. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993]. 
21 Case C-55/94, Gebhard vs. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995]. 
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measure regulating economic activity, since almost by definition regulations may restrict 
profit margins and therefore reduce the attractiveness of pursuing one particular activity. The 
potential excesses of the market access principle have been addressed by the ECJ with a 
number of legal techniques, e.g. Keck22 and two Commission vs. Italy cases.23 But the problem 
refuses to go away, and has again come into full prominence with certain decisions limiting de 
facto the scope of union rights recognized under national legislation (cf. Laval, already 
mentioned, and Viking)24. 
Thus, one arrives at the crux of the matter. The principle of open access, which is the 
cornerstone of SEM policies and the condition for effective competition, puts pressure on 
domestic institutional arrangements in a wide range of very sensitive domains, including 
standards of protection of consumers and the environment, labour market rules, public 
services, and even cultural products such as television and cinema. As a result, when choosing 
between competing products and services, or between potential locations of a professional 
activity or enterprise, Union citizens are implicitly also choosing between the institutions 
underpinning those activities. This has major consequences on private economic incentives 
and national institutions, which must adapt to the common policies and the resulting changes 
in the economic and social environment. 
A major criticism levelled against this approach is that, by setting in motion a process of 
competition between institutions, it might foster a race to the bottom in the levels of 
protection, as countries seek to attract businesses to their jurisdiction. Of course, one must 
recognize that considerations related to the quality of products and locations normally play 
an important role in the expression of individual preferences. Therefore, price is not the only 
variable taken into consideration. In other words, a higher quality of institutions may well 
dominate the preferred choice, even if this sometimes entails a higher price for a product or 
service, or a higher location cost. And yet, this criticism cannot be dismissed light-heartedly. 
Finding the right balance between SEM freedom and national societal preferences remains an 
unresolved issue and, on occasion, a source of severe tensions between the Union institutions 
and its members.  
(b) Article 114 TFEU
Article 114 provides the ‘residual’ legal basis of SEM legislation, to be applied when the Treaty 
does not otherwise provide for a specific legal basis. It can only be used for the 
‘approximation’ of laws and administrative practices, and not for other purposes related to 
the SEM.25 Important ECJ decisions26 on the so called Tobacco Control Directive27 further 
22 Joint cases C-267 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993], where the Court recognized that ‘certain selling 
arrangements’ did not breach Article 34 TFEU. 
23 Case C-518/06 [2009] on motor insurance and Case C-565/08 [2011] on maximum lawyer fees.  
24 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union vs. Viking Line ABP 
and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007]. 
25 Case C-436/03, Europen Parliament vs. Council of the European Union [2006]. 
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clarified that Article 114 can be used to enact measures that contribute to the elimination of 
actual and potential obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, as well to remove 
distortions (actual and potential) of competition arising from national rules. It also clarified 
that, under Article 114, the Union does not have the general legislative power to intervene to 
correct market failure in the SEM. 
A first important implication is that the need for SEM legislation only arises when there is a 
legitimate obstacle to trading within the SEM, as maintained under the imperative need 
exceptions recognized by the TFEU and the ECJ. When mutual recognition works there is no 
need to legislate. Moreover, legislation will target the elimination of those legitimate 
obstacles with measures adequate for removing the restriction, but goes no further. This 
opens the way to minimal harmonization measures strictly commensurate with the restriction 
to be eliminated. It follows that, at least in principle, the Union’s ability to act is circumscribed 
by considerations of subsidiarity, under which it will not act without an obstacle, and 
proportionality, requiring that the constraints imposed on member states are the strict 
minimum required to restore free circulation. 
Two main issues were opened but not resolved by Cassis de Dijon. The first is how member 
states could demonstrate conformity to essential requirements (in a proportionate manner); 
the second is how member states could create sufficient trust in the incoming products 
claiming mutual recognition. This led to the development of a policy for conformity 
assessment. The response was a Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonization 
and standards (the “New Approach”) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 7 May 1985.28 
The principles of the New Approach laid the foundation for the establishment of the 
European standardization system, as now defined by Regulation (EU) 1025/2012, built upon 
three pre-existing standardization organisations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) that have evolved 
into the European Standardization Organizations. The strategic vision for European 
standardization is illustrated in the European Commission (2011a) communication on 
standards, while the legal framework is set out in Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012. Reliance on 
standards for technical specifications has become an accepted principle of the WTO, which 
promotes use of international standards through its agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade.   
26 Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany vs. European Parliament and Council of the European union 
[2000] and Case C-74/99, The Queen vs. Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd 
and Others [2000]. 
27 Directive 98/43/EC. 
28 The New Approach includes the following components: (i) legislative harmonization should be limited to 
essential (performance or functional) requirements that products must meet to enjoy free movement; (ii) 
technical specifications meeting the essential requirements should be laid down in harmonized standards 
‘mandated’ by the harmonization directives; (iii) products manufactured in compliance with harmonized 
standards would benefit from a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements, as 
well as a simplified conformity assessment procedure; (iv) the application of harmonized standards was to 
remain voluntary, and the manufacturers could apply different technical standards to meet the requirements 





An important feature of European standards is that, following publication on the Official 
Journal of the Union, their utilization is open to any interested manufacturer; accordingly, 
their definition and approval must respect strict procedural requirements to ensure that all 
interested parties, notably including, together with manufacturers, consumers, trade unions, 
and environmental interests, are heard during the process of approval. Over time, non-EU 
producers have been granted access to the process on an equal footing. The EU has 
developed policies to ensure that the standard setting process remains open, transparent, 
and non-discriminatory. 
The approval of a standard may become an important factor in defining the market for a 
given product or service, as for instance it famously happened with the GSM standard for 
mobile communications, which has developed into the de-facto global standard for mobile 
communications covering a 90 per cent market share and over 200 countries. This contrasts 
sharply with the US system, predominantly based on proprietary standards, where companies 
compete by trying to  impose their own standards on the market.  
Article 114 is a prime example of the care taken by the Treaty in seeking an appropriate 
balance between national concerns and the overriding goal of free movement.29 The legal 
provisions bounce back and forth between the member states and the European institutions, 
leaving considerable room for accommodation of special circumstances.  
A further element of caution has been introduced with increasing application of the 
precautionary principle whereby, even in the absence of unambiguous scientific evidence, a 
measure may be rejected or justified in view of the nature of a risk or the irreversibility of its 
effects (European Commission 2000a). The principle has made its way into the TFEU with 
reference to environmental policies (Article 191, para. 2) and has played a significant role in 
many areas of health and consumer protection, perhaps not always in the best interest of 
consumers and the economy (Pelkmans 2012). For instance, the principle de-facto led to the 
exclusion of all genetically modified products from European agriculture, including limited 
cultivations for research purposes. As a result, an important branch of modern industry for 
agriculture has been pushed out of Europe. Clearly, we are confronted here with a strong 
cultural element which the SEM rules were eventually forced to accept, even if not based on 
convincing scientific evidence. 
                                                          
29 Thus, (i) in its legislative proposals, the Commission will take as a base a high level of protection (para. 3); (ii) 
the member states are allowed to maintain national provisions (para. 4) and to introduce new legislation (based 
on new scientific evidence, (para. 5) even after the adoption of harmonizing legislation; (iii) when this happens, 
the Commission normally has 6 months (12 months when the matter appear particularly complex and the delay 
does not endanger human health) to approve or reject the measure – a rather short time span, adopted in 
Amsterdam to make rebuttals more difficult; if it doesn’t manage to respond, the measure is deemed approved 
and the Commission must propose new harmonizing legislation that takes the member state concern into 
account; (iv) however the Commission can take the case directly to the ECJ, by derogating from the normal 
procedure of Articles 258 and 259 TFEU when it finds that a member state is making improper use of its powers 
under para.s 4 and 5; (v) finally, harmonizing legislation and even technical standards will normally contain 





(c) Agencies and Networks of Regulators 
In the second half of the past century, the role of the state in the economy has been 
characterized by a remarkable development of administrative law-based approaches to 
achieve complex policy goals, whereby the state has become increasingly active in setting 
standards for economic, social, environmental, and other matters, as well as developing 
separate executive branches for the regulation and oversight of the implementation of 
legislation. In this context, the Union has also undergone a significant transformation from a 
mainly law-producing organization towards an organization actively engaged in the 
administrative implementation of Union law.  
In the process, the Union has developed innovative instruments and approaches by building 
an array of regulatory networks and executive agencies entrusted with implementing tasks, 
with various forms of inclusion of national regulatory bodies. These bodies have emerged in 
an evolutionary process that has created ‘policy islands’ in diverse areas such as food safety, 
chemicals, medicines, financial market regulation, aviation safety, and border controls 
(Hofmann 2016), normally based on Article 114 TFEU. The policy approaches, regulatory and 
enforcement powers and institutional design have responded flexibly to the specific sector’s 
requirements, without a unifying model.  
Table 2 summarizes the main agencies and regulatory networks of the Union, with an 
indication of their nature (forum, network, agency), organization and regulatory powers. As 
may be seen, these bodies, while performing tasks of considerable importance for the 
functioning of the SEM, do not normally have their own supervisory and regulatory powers, 
with limited exceptions such as ESMA, which can, under certain circumstances, forbid short 
selling operations in financial markets and the European Data Protection Board, which 
approves the criteria for the accreditation of certification bodies. The mode of operation, 
then, is that agency acts are adopted under the Commission’s implementing powers 
delegated by the Council – with unwritten rules of the game whereby the Commission will 
normally ratify the agencies’ decisions without interfering, except under special 
circumstances. 
A feature worth mentioning concerns governance arrangements: decisions may be less 
incisive when the agency’s governing body is made up exclusively of representatives of 
national authorities, e.g., for the ESAs for financial markets supervision. The meagre results 
achieved by these agencies in the promotion of common standards of supervision may be due 
precisely to this feature. Similar arrangements have been adopted for the Supervisory Board 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, raising the risk of politically-influenced decisions in 
individual cases. This contrasts sharply with the model set by the governing council of the 
ECB, which has, at its centre, an executive board manned by independent officials (appointed 
by the Council).  
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Table 2. Main EU Agencies and Networks 
NATURE ORGANIZATION/ 
GOVERNANCE 
REGULATORY POWER SUPERVISORY POWER/ 
ENFORCEMENT IN INDIVIDUAL CASES 
BEREC 






NRAs and Comm.; no 
legal personality; 
new proposal to 
transform BEREC into 
a fully-fledged 
agency  
Board of Regulators + 
staff  
No: guidelines, best practices and 
non-binding opinions on draft 
NRAs’ and Comm. measures; 
advice to the EU institutions  
No: opinions in cross border disputes and on some draft 
decisions of the Comm. 
ACER  
Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators 
EU body with legal 
personality 
Board of Regulators + 
staff + 
Board of Appeal 
No: contribution to network 
codes; non-binding guidelines, 
opinions and advice to the EU 
institutions 
Yes: individual decisions on technical issues in specific 
cross-border cases, to be challenged before the Board of 




Network of national 
authorities; no legal 
personality 
No board, no staff No No. The 2016 proposal of new CPC Reg. provides for a 
common enforcement action, coordinated by the Comm., 




Network of Comm. 
and NCAs; mainly a 
discussion and 
cooperation forum; 
no legal personality 
No board, no staff No: recommendations and best 
practices  
No: EU competition law is enforced by the Comm. and the 
NCAs. The Comm. intervention relieves NCAs of their 
competence 
Article 29 Data 
Protection Working 
Party 
Advisory body, no 
legal personality  
Secretariat provided by 
DG Just. 
No: opinions to the Comm. + 
recommendations and guidelines 
No: only national authorities are competent to enforce EU 
data protection rules  
European Data 
Protection Board 
established by the 
2016 Reg., not yet 
operational 
Independent EU 
body with legal 
personality 
Board + staff Yes: in addition to soft law acts, 
the Board approves the criteria 
for the accreditation of 
certification bodies 












EU agencies with 
legal personality 
Each ESA has: 
a Board of supervisors 
[national authorities, 
Comm., EU Systemic 
Risk Board, the other 
ESAs (+ECB in EBA)] + 
staff 
The Board of Appeal is 
a joint body of the 
three ESAs  
No: draft regulatory and 
implementing standards (not 
involving policy decisions), to be 
examined and formally adopted 
by the Comm.; opinions to the EU 
institutions  
Yes: in some circumstances ESAs adopt individual decisions 
addressed to financial market participants; they settle 
disagreements between national authorities in cross-border 
situations 
ESMA has a limited direct enforcement power for Credit 





An important issue in the development of the agency model at the Union level has been the 
‘non-delegation’ doctrine based on early decisions by the ECJ whereby (i) a delegation of 
power that is too broad and insufficiently defined is prohibited (Meroni)30 and (ii) agencies 
cannot adopt normative measures (Romano).31 The reason behind these judgements was 
that, besides possibly upsetting the institutional balance established by the Treaties, 
delegation to the agencies could subtract their acts to the scrutiny of the ECJ.32 
 A recent decision by the ECJ33 seems to indicate some ‘mellowing’ of the non-delegation 
doctrine (Pelkmans and Simoncini 2014). The British government was seeking the annulment 
of Article 28 of the ESMA regulation, empowering the agency to forbid short selling in certain 
specific circumstances. The ECJ rejected the request, arguing that the delegation of powers is 
lawful as long as it indicates objective criteria and circumscribed conditions for their exercise, 
and these criteria are subject to judicial review. It further argued that the Council may 
delegate specific powers to EU bodies with specific technical expertise and broadened the 
scope of delegation under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. 
While this is a welcomed development, it still falls significantly short of what would be 
needed to develop fully-fledged independent European regulatory agencies (Pelkmans 2012). 
 
(d) Public Services 
The Monti Report notes that “since the nineties, the place of public services within the single 
market has been a persistent irritant in the European public debate” (p. 73) but believes that 
the discussions ‘within the Treaty’ should have been settled by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon with 
the reformulation of Article 14 and Protocol 26 on services of general interest (SGI). The 
Report sees these services as an important building block for reconciling the single market 
and the social and citizenship dimension – as a component of the ‘highly competitive social 
market economy’ that the Lisbon Treaty has identified as a main objective of European 
integration.  
The central Treaty provision is Article 106 TFEU, which sets out the principle of (proportional) 
exemption of services of general economic interest (SGEI) from competition rules when their 
application might endanger the fulfilment of their mission. Over the years, a set of policies 
and legal principles have been developed to allow the member states full freedom in deciding 
what is public service but restrictions have been placed on the means of implementation.34 
Article 106 has provided an important instrument for dismantling special and exclusive rights 
                                                          
30 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni and & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche Spa vs. High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community [1958]. 
31 Case 98/80, Giuseppe Romano vs. Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [1981]. 
32 This argument is now less relevant, since the Lisbon Treaty permits judicial review of the agencies’ acts (cf. 
Article 263 para. 1 TFEU). 
33 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom vs. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014]. 
34 Cf. European Commission (2011b) and, for the ground-breaking approach to the liberalization of telecoms, 




protecting national monopolists in telecoms, postal services, energy and transport. Universal 
service has been the key to political compromises underlying liberalization: under competitive 
conditions a vastly superior range and quality of services would be made available, compared 
to the previous situation of state monopolies.  
Discussions and controversies have flourished especially on the application of state aid rules. 
The problem has been largely resolved by the ECJ with its Altmark decision, under which 
public service compensation does not constitute state aid when certain standards are 
respected,35 and by the Commission’s subsequent efforts to design a comprehensive set of 
rules on compensation of public service obligations (with the Monti-Kroes package in 2005 
and the Almunia package in 2012).36 SEM rules also fully apply to the selection of the provider 
of public services. The case law of the ECJ has consistently maintained that fundamental 
Treaty freedoms also apply to the provision of public services, placing constraints on the 
selection of providers. Accordingly, the exception for in-house provision has been narrowly 
construed and a set of principles has been developed for the selection of the providers. 
Recently, the new package of directives for public procurement of 2014 has included for the 
first a specific directive on the award of concessions – setting for instance rules on their 
duration. 37 
The revised Article 14 TFEU has made the member states and the Union institutions jointly 
responsible “that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly 
economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their mission”; it goes on to 
state that “the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations ... shall 
establish these principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of 
Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such 
services”. Thus, a paradoxical result of ten years of squabbling over the issue is that European 
institutions have acquired the power to regulate the matter; while Protocol 26 has reaffirmed 
the sole competence of the member states “to provide, commission and organise non-
economic services of general interest” (Article 2).  
(e) Establishment and Company Mobility 
Thanks to the early recognition of direct effect to the Treaty freedoms under Articles 49 and 
53, freedom of establishment represented an important advance of liberalization in the IM 
well before the SEA. Two key ECJ decisions adapted the Cassis de Dijon test for restrictions to 
                                                          
35 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg vs. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht [2003]. For the Altmark exception to 
apply, there must be a service in the pursuit of a legitimate public interest objective; the parameters for 
compensation are set in advance, and they are based on a reasonable rate of return of an efficient undertaking. 
Cf. Sauter (2015).  
36 Cf. European Commission (2013).  




freedom of establishment (Gebhard, already mentioned) and the recognition of qualifications 
(Vlassopoulou)38, opening the way to subsequent ‘horizontal’ liberalization Directives.39   
Freedom of establishment, however, only goes so far as to allow the incoming entity to enter 
and operate without restrictions – subject to the safeguard of measures adopted on grounds 
of public policy or public health provided for by Article 52 TFEU – “under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where … establishment is effected”.40 In 
other words, freedom of establishment liberalizes entry into domestic markets, thereby 
increasing competition in the markets defined by existing national rules, but does not entail 
per se either the mutual recognition or the harmonization of those national rules. Therefore, 
in service markets, where significant restrictions still limit the free supply of cross-border 
services, freedom of establishment alone wouldn’t have guaranteed full market integration; 
to this end, directives liberalizing the provision of specific services, and eventually the Services 
Directive, were also needed.   
The provision of certain services is subject in most countries to regulatory requirements and 
constraints on the quality and competence of the provider, natural or legal person. A major 
regulatory innovation has been the establishment of common licence arrangements – the 
‘European passport’ – for the main categories of financial services, based on minimal 
harmonization of national licences. Under this system, an institution meeting the minimal 
prudential requirements (capital, reserves, quality of management, etc.) can set up branches 
and subsidiaries freely throughout the Union without further authorization.41 
On company mobility, the Treaty approach was predicated on outright hostility to companies 
moving the main centre of operation to another member state, but a number of ECJ decisions 
have opened broad breaches into restrictions on the free choice of legal seat by EU 
corporations. At the root of this contradiction lies a fundamental difference in national legal 
systems between those adhering to the so-called ‘real seat’ doctrine (e.g. France, Germany 
and Italy) whereby the legal seat of a company coincides with its headquarters and main 
centre of operations, and the ‘incorporation’ doctrine, whereby the legal seat simply is where 
the company was incorporated (adopted e.g. by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). 
Earlier ECJ decisions (i.e. Daily Mail and Cartesio)42 had confirmed the power of national 
authorities to regulate companies maintaining their legal seat in the country. Therefore, they 
could legitimately impose restrictions on companies wishing to transfer of the main centre of 
                                                          
38 Case C- 340/89 Vlassopoulou vs. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- u. Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991]. 
39 Directives 2005/36/EC and 2013/55/EU. 
40 Article 49 TFEU. 
41 The system has now been extended to virtually all institutions offering financial and investment services: 
starting in the 1990s with the banking and insurance directives and private investment funds (UCITS), and 
continuing in the 2000s with ‘occupational’ pension funds and alternative investment funds (hedge funds and 
private equity), security issuance (the prospectus directive), and investment services – with directives covering 
stock exchanges (MiFID) and post-trading actors (CSDR). 
42 Respectively Case 81/87, The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily 




operation while maintaining their legal seat (primary establishment) in the country of origin, 
could not prevent a company from converting into a company of another member state. 
Moreover, the national authorities cannot require the winding up or liquidation of a company 
wishing to exit. 
With Centros,43 the ECJ went much further with regard to the freedom to combine primary 
and secondary establishment so as to minimize the costs and legal requirements of 
incorporation, while exercising its activities elsewhere. Centros was a private company 
incorporated in the United Kingdom, whose branch in Denmark was its only centre of activity. 
This arrangement had been designed to escape costly capital requirements under the Danish 
law. The Danish registrar of companies refused to register the company’s branch on grounds 
that it really was its main centre of activity. However, the ECJ ruled that the registrar’s refusal 
violated freedom of establishment. It said that it wasn’t a case of abuse since the rule that 
was being circumvented concerned the formation of the company and not the pursuit of 
certain trades. The decision has called into question the continuing applicability of the real 
seat doctrine; some have seen this decision as opening the door to a Delaware-style race to 
the bottom. 
The Commission has been pondering what to do about this situation, but has yet been unable 
to decide on a legislative initiative to clarify matters. The issue is broader than the transfer of 
the legal seat, as it also involves the questions of cross-border mergers and divisions.44  
The resistance to making progress this road is motivated by the potential impact on 
established forms of protection of workers’ rights, e.g. the German system of workers’ 
participation in corporate supervisory boards. The European Company Statute is a case in 
point: the eventual agreement, reached after a twenty years stalemate, includes the 
Regulation providing for limited harmonization of corporate rules (e.g. minimum capital, the 
choice of dual vs. single board, the transfer of legal seat)45 and a tightly prescriptive Directive 
on workers participation.46 The European company may be created only by transformation of 
existing companies, rather than creation of a new company; and the legal seat can be 
transferred but must coincide with the ‘central administration’ (i.e. the main centre of 
operation). At all events, the European Company may be constituted only after reaching an 
agreement on a model for worker involvement in management decisions, entailing the 
‘grandfathering’ of existing statutory protections. In the event of a transfer of the legal seat to 
another country, the transfer project must indicate the consequences for workers. 
Similarly, the Takeover Bid Directive47 was emasculated in frantic last minute negotiations 
with provisions allowing member states and individual companies not to apply its key 
provisions – i.e. the ‘passivity rule’ preventing the board from adopting defensive measures 
                                                          
43 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd vs. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999]. 
44 For a comprehensive review of these matters, see Schmidt (2016).  
45 Regulation (EC) 2157/2001. 
46 Directive 2001/86/EC. 




without the consent of shareholders, and the ‘breakthrough rule’, suspending all limitations 
on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders on the occasion of the bid. 
All this calls attention to the limits placed on the integration process by rigid labour market 
institutions: as long as labour is protected by rigid hiring and firing rules, then mobility of 
capital for direct investment will likely be restrained, so as to limit cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions that may endanger existing protections. As convincingly argued by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), changes in market institutions are sometimes complicated by 
complementarities between them, so changing one in isolation becomes quite difficult.  
(f) On the Posting of Workers 
A source of persistent tension between free movement and national protective arrangements 
is the Posted Workers Directive;48 it impinges directly on the most sensitive issue of labour 
mobility, which in the European environment of rigid labour markets remains deeply 
unpopular and strongly resisted. 
In Rush Portuguesa49 the ECJ affirmed that Articles 56 and 57 TFEU “preclude a Member State 
from prohibiting a person providing services established in another Member State from 
moving freely on its territory with all of his staff”, notably including non EU-nationals, to carry 
out a service contract. Posted workers cannot seek access to the host labour market and must 
return to the place of origin or residence once the contract is completed. The decision, 
however, maintained that Union law does not preclude member states from extending their 
own labour legislation, or collective labour agreements, to workers employed temporarily in 
the country. The Directive went further and removed that discretion, establishing instead that 
the member state must apply to posted workers a ‘nucleus of mandatory rules’ relating to the 
minimum wage, working time, and equal treatment, and only collective agreements satisfying 
certain conditions.  
Then the Laval dispute arose, setting a Latvian firm that had won a contract in Sweden against 
local labour unions. The ECJ ruled that the host state could only insist on the application of 
national labour laws for matters exhaustively listed in Article 3(1) of the Directive; this did not 
cover certain supplements and insurance premiums, and in addition Sweden had failed to 
establish the minimum wage in that activity with the procedure of the directive.50 More 
broadly, local unions’ demands fell outside the scope of the Directive and, therefore, 
industrial action to enforce national collective agreements was incompatible with Article 56 
TFEU. 
Viking was a Finnish company wishing to reflag in order to reduce labour costs; the decision 
was met by a seamen’s union strike. The ECJ again ruled that the trade union’s proposed 
                                                          
48 Directive 96/71/EC. 
49 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ld. vs. Office national d’immigration [1990].  




strike was a restriction on freedom of establishment. It said that, while in principle action to 
protect the jobs and conditions of employment by union members liable to be affected by 
reflagging could be justified in view of the goal of protecting workers, such a view would no 
longer be valid if it were established that the jobs and employment conditions were not 
jeopardised or threatened in practice.51 
These cases have exposed deep fault lines between the SEM and the social dimension at 
national level (Monti 2010). With the progressive liberalization of services, the divergent 
social and employment conditions in member states offer fresh opportunities to reduce 
labour cost, calling into the line of fire the more generous protections. The implication 
whereby union strike rules would have to adapt to SEM requirements raises enormous 
controversy and opposition.  
Following the Monti Report, the Commission undertook to propose revisions to the posted 
workers directive, e.g. by setting time limits (24 months) after which the host country 
remuneration and other labour laws would automatically apply to the contract in question, 
and excluding temporary agencies posting workers from the application of the directive. 
However, perhaps predictably the proposal met with strong opposition from  Eastern 
European member states: fourteen chambers of national parliaments from eleven member 
states issued a ‘yellow card’ against the Commission’s proposal for violating subsidiarity 
(under Treaty Protocol 2).   
3. The Economic impact of the Single European Market 
Almost thirty years have elapsed since the enactment of the SEA, which brought about a jump 
in integration in the EU through the creation of the SEM. The preceding exposé shows the 
enormous progress achieved through legislation now covering all the main sectors of activity, 
as well as horizontal inducements for innovation and new technologies. And yet, the 
performance of the EU economy remains far from satisfactory and the legacy of the economic 
and financial crisis still looms large. Output and productivity growth have been unsatisfactory, 
unemployment remains high in a number of countries, investment levels have not recovered 
to pre-crisis levels, and financial markets are fragmented by confidence factors, reflecting 
large sovereign debts and dubious capital and asset positions in parts of the banking system 
(OECD 2016).  
Of course, the SEM policies cannot be held responsible for all that does not work, nor could 
they claim all the merit for what seemingly works well in economic integration. The creation 
of the SEM was expected to bring about distinct economic benefits on a number of fronts, 
including cost reductions through the elimination of border tariffs and regulatory barriers; 
economies of scale, as companies restructure and merge to exploit the larger market size and 
optimize their cross-border productive structure and logistics; efficiency increases due to 
                                                          




stiffer competition; increased labour and capital mobility for cross-border direct investment; 
and lower financial transaction costs as a result of the liberalization of capital flows and 
greater financial integration, possibly with an increased role of capital markets in the direct 
financing of business (equity and bonds). The euro was expected to boost the beneficial 
effects on all of these fronts, thanks to full price transparency. 
While there has been progress on all of these fronts, the attendant benefits seem to have 
been less than hoped for and, moreover, to have affected some countries, regions and 
activities quite diversely. This was to be expected. Large countries are better positioned to 
gain from economies of scale, given the larger size of their companies, while small open 
economies would benefit more from the reduction in transaction costs engendered by falling 
barriers to trade. Adjustment costs would be higher in countries with closed markets and 
protected industries. The twin forces of globalization and technical change have also played a 
major role in changing the economic environment, magnifying the different capacities of EU 
member states to meet the challenge. Again, company size significantly influences the ability 
to manage new technologies and distributed production organizations made possible by 
globalization.   
Labour market flexibility is a critical variable in determining the countries’ ability to meet the 
challenge of a rapidly changing economic environment. The labour market economic 
literature describes the different efficiency of four labour market protective arrangements 
observed in Europe in managing labour relocations when companies and activities need 
restructuring: the Anglo-Saxon flexible model, the flexi-security model of Nordic European 
countries, the consensual corporatist model practiced in Germany and other continental 
countries, and the ‘Southern’ model (Sapir 2003). The last one is characterised by the rigid 
defence of existing jobs and the maximum resistance to industrial restructuring, leading most 
often to chronic unemployment and public sector deficits to support ailing companies and no 
longer viable jobs. More generally, the benefits of market opening measures can be 
profoundly affected by domestic policies, which can aid competitive adjustments or tame 
them with countervailing protective measures.  
Against this background, disentangling the specific economic impact of the SEM is next to 
impossible. A less ambitious substitute is to examine the degree of success of SEM polices in 
fostering market opening reforms in EU countries on the one hand, and to review the 
countries’ growth and productivity performance to identify areas of more visible weakness on 
the other.   
(a) Market Opening under Single Market Legislation 
Over the past three decades progress in enacting market opening legislation in the SEM has 
been impressive, as has been shown, and most economic activities are now covered by SEM 
rules.  A new ambitious strategy for the digital market is aiming at extending market opening 




However, implementation of legislation has been uneven, as shown by extensive reviews of 
remaining SEM barriers undertaken by the OECD, the European Commission and private 
analysts (cf. Europe Economics 2013, European Commission 2015(b) and (c), Ilzkovitz et al. 
2007, OECD 2016, Pelkmans 2012). 
Mutual recognition plays an important role in the functioning of the SEM for both 
manufactured products (covering about one quarter of intra-EU trade) and services, 
especially in the recognition of qualifications. However, its practical implementation is 
hampered by legal uncertainties, bureaucratic resistance and a lack of awareness among 
individuals, companies and public administrations – despite strengthened efforts to 
streamline its application with Regulation (EC) 764/2008. The services directive has not yet 
succeeded in clearing the ground of excessive or outright illegal authorization requirements 
to start businesses, limitations to the duration of authorizations and requirements to register 
with local chambers or professional associations. Extensive restrictions are still reported for 
legal, accounting, engineering and architect services. The implementation of procurement 
directives has remained uneven, with a number of countries falling well below average in the 
share of public procurement contacts published for open bidding. Retail establishment rules 
remain very restrictive in some countries. Lack of adequate physical interconnections 
hampers the establishment of a functioning SEM for energy. Excessive red tape still impedes 
market entry across the board.  
The quality of regulation is also not always satisfactory, imposing sometimes disproportionate 
burdens on businesses without adequate evaluation of expected benefits, e.g. the REACH 
regulation for tracing chemical products or the rules for clinical trials. The Commission’s 
efforts to base new legislation on adequate impact assessment have often been frustrated, 
owing to the Council’s and Parliament’s lack of willingness to cooperate. Regulatory instability 
has been high, in response to contingent political demands by the member states, creating 
uncertainty and higher risks for investors, especially for projects with long time-horizons. 
OECD analyses have also highlighted the adverse impact of ‘regulatory creep’ – national 
actions that add to the burden of regulation by adding unnecessary requirements (‘gold 
plating’) or failing to remove inconsistent higher level regulations. Regulatory fragmentation 
and disproportionate restrictions across the SEM continue to hamper the opportunity to 
expand business in specific sectors, notably in the transport sector overburdened by load and 
size limits, traffic restrictions, local restrictions in ports and complex administrative 
procedures. In rail transport, lack of interoperability between systems holds back cross-
border freight. 
Several barriers continue to impede the development of e-commerce – which will hopefully 
be dealt with by the new programme for the Digital Single Market. In this regard, data 
localization requirements that force companies to store and process data in servers physically 




of new businesses. Some member states are also unduly restricting or forbidding the online 
sale of certain products, e.g. veterinary products. 
An issue that deserve continuing attention is the limited cross-border mobility of productive 
factors, labour and capital. Labour mobility in the EU remains low, reflecting cultural and 
linguistic barriers on one hand, and the lack of harmonization of professional qualifications 
and supplementary pension entitlements on the other (OECD 2016, Dhéret et al. 2013, 
Ilzkovitz et al. 2007).  
Under the revised professional qualifications directive, member states are now held to 
stricter requirements of justification when they want to limit access to professional activities; 
however, the number of recognitions remains low, relative to employment, and the process 
of recognition appears slow and cumbersome, with great variation amongst member states. A 
paradoxical result of differing rules is that nationals from countries with a more liberal regime 
of recognition may be confronted by greater hurdles when trying to enter the market of 
another country with a more restrictive regime. For example, engineering is not a regulated 
profession in some member states while in others is regulated through licensing.  
The Union also seems rather ineffective at attracting high-skilled personnel from third-
country nationals. Effective deployment of the new European Professional Card (for EU 
residents) and the Blue Card scheme (for third-country nationals) could improve matters on 
all these fronts. The risk of losing supplementary pension rights and long vesting periods for 
acquiring new rights are strong disincentives to seek work abroad; Directive 2014/50/EU (to 
be transposed by 2018) improves matters somewhat by establishing certain minimum 
standards for the protection of mobile workers’ rights.  
In general, differing protections of unemployment and health risks and low portability of 
attendant rights represent an important barrier to the free movement of labour. On this, 
Pelkmans (2012) called attention to the fact that Article 3 TEU includes among the founding 
values of the Union free movement of ‘persons’, rather than ‘workers’; that Article 45 TFEU 
has been regarded as less of a priority by the Council and Parliament; and that the workers 
employed abroad will operate normally under a broad form of host-county control, whose 
effect is that of protecting national labour market regulations. This is the main motivation 
behind the Parliaments’ rejection of the country-of-origin principle in the Services Directive, 
which was included in the Commission’s original proposal; it is also the reason behind 
growing demands to change the Posted Workers Directive to include stronger enforcement of 
local (host-country) working conditions. 
Of course, the preservation of national protective systems is inconsistent with the creation of 
an integrated market for labour. An important consequence, sometimes overlooked by SEM 
analysts, is that whenever SEM legislation comes too close to challenging rigid labour market 
institutions, implementation may become very slow – as has often been the case with free 
establishment, which still largely relies on host country control for business conduct rules and 




This is also in all likelihood an important explanation for the general disfavour for unfettered 
(real) capital mobility, as reflected in the treaty and legislative provisions on company 
mobility, as has been discussed. This has not prevented a significant increase in intra-EU 
direct investment, within a global trend of strongly rising FDI flows, as well as cross-border 
M&A operations. Cross-border flows were especially significant in the early years of the SEM 
programme and, later on, for the new entrants with the 2004 enlargement, reflecting the 
outsourcing of manufacturing activity and the acquisition of substantial stakes in domestic 
banks by EU-15 corporations. However, important components of the corporate structure, 
especially in the EU-15, remain closed to foreign acquisitions, e.g. in the network utility 
services, where in some member states the state still holds large stakes in national 
monopolies and foreign acquisitions of incumbent ‘champions’ would be discouraged.  
Financial market remains fragmented along national lines as a result of the financial crises in 
2008-09 and 2011-12, which have left a legacy of high public and private debts, as well as lack 
of confidence in the sovereigns and the banking systems of the Southern periphery of the 
Euro Area. Banking Union, already quite advanced with the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory System and the Single Resolution Mechanism, and the ongoing project for the 
creation of an effective Capital Market Union are expected to remove these market 
segmentations, which however for the time being still play a significant role in constraining 
SME access to financing and depressing growth. 
(b) Economic Effects of the Single European Market 
The economic literature generally agrees that the SEM has had a positive effect on the 
economy of its members, although there is wide disagreement on quantification.  
Strong positive effects are evident in intra-EU trade for goods (Eichengreen and Boltho 2008), 
which between 1992 and 2012 increased from 12 to 22 per cent of GDP; the increase had 
been even stronger in the preceding decades, characterized by intensive trade liberalization 
measures internationally, and actually slowed down afterwards (Vetter 2013). It has been 
estimated that since 1960 exports and imports within the Union have climbed to a level 8 per 
cent higher than they would have been without the SEM (Straathof et al. 2008). Fournier et 
al. (2015) have estimated an overall impact of accession to the European Economic Area of 
roughly 60 per cent increase in trade intensity; however, they also find that regulatory 
restrictions and regulatory heterogeneity still represent an important impediment to trade.  
The numbers are much smaller for trade in services, which represent about 6 per cent of 
Union GDP, but have shown steady increases in recent years, with little adverse impact from 
the twin crises of the past decade. Business services have been one of the most dynamic 
components.   
In the 2000s, intra-EU trade between EU-15 countries has remained unchanged at around 20 




thus, in recent years the latter countries account for much of the trade creation in the SEM 
(European Commission 2015c).   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the most important driver of internationalization 
and integration of the European economy, with yearly flows rising from around 1 per cent of 
GDP in the 1980s to around 5 per cent of GDP till the financial crisis. FDI inflows have also 
represented an important component of total fixed capital formation, some 10 per cent, with 
a peak of 40 per cent in 2000. The launch of the SEM programme and the two enlargements 
(in 1995 and 2004) resulted in substantial anticipation effects, which subsided once the main 
integration steps were accomplished. The increasing share of intra-EU FDI flows in total flows 
suggests that the SEM has played a role; indeed, in the middle of the 1990s and the middle of 
the 2000s, the share of intra-EU-15 flows rose from around 50 per cent to 68 per cent of total 
FDI outflows, and to 78 per cent for FDI inflows (Ilzkovitz et al. 2007). As with trade, the 
financial crises have taken a heavy toll for EU-15 FDI investment flows, while those to the EU-
13 (new entrants) have been fairly steady. The latter have been dominated by mergers and 
acquisitions of existing companies, while green-field investment has been more important for 
the EU-15. 
The degree of integration is normally gauged by the observed degree of convergence of 
prices, wages and productivity. The aggregate price level convergence has slowly improved 
through the 1990s and the 2000s until the financial crisis; afterwards, it stabilized in the Euro 
Area and has even gone into reverse in the EU-28, probably reflecting exchange rate 
adjustments between the euro and the non-euro currencies (Chart 1).  
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The coefficient of variation indicates the extent of variability relative to the mean of a series. 
Here the series shown are the price level index of household final consumption expenditure for 
the EU-28 and EA-19, the implicit regional price deflator for the United States and the intercity 
index of price differentials of consumer goods and services for Canada. Source: OECD Economic 




However, as may be seen, price dispersion remains well above that observed for the United 
States and Canada – confirming once again that integration in the SEM still is still far from 
fulfilling its potential. 
Wage data show increased convergence within the EU-15 from the early nineties, and a 
considerable increase in dispersion with the enlargement to the EU-13 in the 2000s (Europe 
Economics 2013).  
Financial services show greater variation in the covariance index, with a rapid convergence 
between the 1970s and the late 1980s, then a sharp increase in divergence until 1993-4, 
followed by a sharp decline through 1997, and mildly increasing dispersion up to the middle 
of the 2000s. The explanation of this greater variability may perhaps lie in the sharp 
movements in exchange rates in the early nineties, followed by the inception of the euro. It is 
not unreasonable to think that these momentous changes may have affected the 
remuneration of staff in the financial services industry, with larger gains in the financial 
centres. At all events, wage dispersion remains substantial and seems to go well beyond what 
could be expected in a well- integrated SEM.  
Productivity, on the other hand, did not converge at all, and in fact showed growing 
divergences within industries and across countries, especially within the Euro Area (cf. total 
factor productivity indexes in Chart 2, upper quadrant). This seems to have been mainly the 
result of applying one monetary policy to areas with different price and cost dynamics. On 
one hand, the inception of the euro all but eliminated risk premia over borrowing in higher 
inflation countries, whose borrowers could thus get loans at negative real interest rates for 
low quality projects. On the other hand, the rise in the relative price of manufactured 
products in higher inflation countries encourage a shift in the allocation of resources towards 
services and construction, typically characterised by lower productivity. 
Table 3 reports some sectoral data of productivity growth in the EU and the US in 1980-95 
and 1995-2005. As may be seen, the labour and total factor productivity (TFP) slowed down 
between the two periods in the Union and accelerated in the US. The disaggregated data for 
labour productivity indicate that the main component of the gap with the US was in 
distribution (retail)  services, where in the US fierce competition was set in motion by the 
application of the new ICT technologies to logistics, parcel delivery and inventory 
management. The last line of the table brings together the contributions to labour 
productivity increases of technology – from changing labour skills, ICT capital per hour worked 
and TFP. This highlights the growing technology gap that has developed relative to the US, in 
a period of dramatic technological change, owing to insufficient competition and closed 







Chart 2a. Total factor productivity (1996=100) 
 
Source: the Conference Board 
 
Chart 2b. Quality of institutions (2014, %) 
 
Source: our updating and reclassification of chart from Boltho and Carlin (2012). Estimate 
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Table 3. Productivity growth in the market economy (annual average growth rates, %) 
 EU  US  
 1980-1995  1995-2005  1980-1995  1995-2005  
Labour productivity  2.5 1.5 1.9 2.9 
TFP  1.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 
Market services labour productivity  1.4 1.0 1.5 3.0 
of which due to:      
distribution services  1.1 0.7 1.2 1.5 
finance and business services  0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 
personal services  -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 
Contribution of the knowledge economy 
to labour productivity growth  
1.7 1.1 1.6 2.6 
EU refers to: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain 
and UK. Source: Timmer M.P., R. Inklaar, M. O’Mahony and B. van Ark (2010), Economic Growth in 
Europe, Cambridge University Press. 
 
As a result, labour cost and competitive conditions showed large and increasing divergences, 
leading to growing external imbalances and, eventually, to Europe-specific acute financial 
instability. This must reflect, in turn, structural divergences in national macro-economic 
policies and national protections able to insulate markets and industries from the competitive 
pressures stemming from the SEM. Thus, the ultimate obstacle to reaping the full benefits of 
the SEM lie in national economic policies sustaining inflation differentials and market 
segmentations, in direct contrast with integration in the SEM.  
The increasingly divergent course of national policies within the Euro Area is also confirmed 
by observed changes in the quality of institutions, as measured by World Bank indicators 
(Chart 2, lower quadrant; the Chart is drawn from Boltho and Carlin 2012 with our updating). 
The Chart reports four indicators, that is respect of the rule of law, the control of corruption, 
the quality of regulation and the effectiveness of government, and for each indicator 
compares the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ (PIIGS) of the Euro Area.52 The striking feature is that 
the periphery not only had a worse quality of institutions than the core from the start, but the 
gap widened over time. 
Further evidence pointing in the same direction is provided by the new composite indicators 
of financial integration developed by the ECB (FINTECs), focussing on the four most important 
segments of the financial markets, namely money, bonds, equity and banking markets (ECB 
2015); the indicators, which separately cover prices (interest rates) and quantities (portfolio 
flows), are reported in Chart 3. As may be seen, the price-based indicator shows higher 
                                                          
52 The core includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands; the periphery (PIGS), 




volatility, rising continuously from the second part of the 1990s (clearly, in anticipation of 
monetary union), falling precipitously with the global financial crisis (2008-09) and crushing 
with the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis (2010-12). It still is well below the pre-crisis level. The 
quantity-based indicator appears more stable; it is interesting that it flattened, but did not fall 
after the global financial crisis, while it did recede after the sovereign debt crisis (which 
indeed saw an interruption of money market and interbank financial flows between core and 
periphery). It is now slowly recovering. 
 
Chart 3. Price- and quantity-based FINTECs 
 
FINTEC stands for FINancial INTEgration Composite. The price-based FINTEC aggregates ten 
indicators covering the period 1995-Q1 – 2014-Q4, and the quantity-based FINTEC 
aggregates five indicators available from the 1999-Q1 to the 2014-Q3. For a detailed 
description of the FINTEC and its input data, see Statistical Annex of ECB (2015).  
Source: ECB (2015). 
 
Banking Union has been successful in turning both indicators upward again; however, the ECB 
policies of quantitative easing may be overstating the return of integration to the extent that 
they artificially swell asset prices and depress yields on riskier assets from the periphery. In 
this regard, the Capital Markets Union initiatives can play a complementary role in fostering 
truly integrated capital markets by pushing the development of the cross-border bond and 
equity market segments, thus increasing the scope of private risk sharing in cushioning the 
impact of new idiosyncratic financial shocks. 
While market opening and integration are expected to set in motion beneficial micro-
economic effects – mainly by increasing competitive pressures and improving resource 
allocation – a number of factors previously described may impede the translation of these 
stimuli into improved macro-economic performance.  
The Cecchini Report (1988) held the promise that the removal of frontier controls, the 
liberalization of public procurement and financial services, and the supply effects deriving 
from market responses to the new competitive environment, would raise EU-12 GDP by 




come to the conclusion that the actual outcome was smaller, around 2 per cent (Vetter 2013, 
Ilzkovitz et al. 2007); but higher estimates have not been absent. Most notably, Eichengreen 
and Boltho (2008) gauged that European integration has added at least 5 per cent of extra 
GDP growth, although they recognize that much of trade opening would in all likelihood have 
happened anyway.  
Mariniello et al. (2015) pointed out two developments that may help explain why the 
outcome has fallen short of expectations. One is the dramatic increase in the share of the 
economy of services, which are largely non-tradables, and now typically represent some 70 
per cent or more of advanced economies’ GDP. The other, already mentioned, is that national 
policies in many domains have not been supportive of the goal of integration. They mention 
in this regard undue rents, rigid labour market rules, industrial policies supporting national 
champions, including monopolistic supply of network services, and cumbersome procedures 
to set up new businesses, among the main factors hampering the competitive process and its 
‘creative destruction’ dynamic effects.  
They point out the fact that SMEs are often protected from the competitive forces within the 
SEM as a potentially counterproductive policy, arguing that they could not otherwise survive. 
However, the question arises as to whether these policies are leading to sub-optimal results, 
e.g. by reducing the ability to exploit economies of scale. Similarly, inefficient regulation of 
network utility services (e.g. in telecoms) may create fresh market segmentations, rather that 
removing those in existence. 
Conclusions 
Over the past thirty years, the SEM has made impressive progress, growing to cover the main 
economic activities, from manufactured goods to all categories of services, network utilities 
and public services, public procurement and the recognition of professional qualifications, as 
well as the market for codified technology, that for long lagged behind. A new ambitious 
initiative now aims at establishing a fully-fledged online digital market. 
Implementation, however, has been wanting. Globalization, technological change and the 
financial crises have impoverished the working classes and seemingly drained all appetite for 
further market opening. National policies have all too often been insufficiently supportive, 
when not outright hostile, towards the goal of market integration. As a result, the past ten 
years have seen little progress in market opening within the Union, even in areas where there 
would be low-hanging fruits to collect – e.g. the completion of the SEM for natural gas and 
electricity. The Monti Report (2010) has called attention to the need to address social 
resistance to further integration by aiming at a more acceptable equilibrium between market 
opening and the protection of the rights and interests of working classes, thus re-establishing 




The ambition to push forward the goal of a genuine Single European Market– harnessing the 
joint commitment of EU institutions and national governments and administrations – has not 
been abandoned, and still finds powerful advocates in academia (cf. Pelkmans 2016) as well 
as the European Parliament (see the High Level Panel of Experts 2016).  However, resuming 
progress will continue to be an uphill battle as long as the Union cannot lift its growth rates 
and show greater ability to combat unemployment and bring relief to the standard of living of 
working classes. 
Here, there is a paradox: while the SEM would in itself be a powerful engine of higher growth 
and better employment prospects, without higher growth it is not likely to find sufficient 
support among European citizens, raising the risk that protectionism will return and that the 
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